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INTRODUCTION
This note is intended to provide the reader with an overview
of federal attorney fee shifting jurisprudence. It provides a de-
tailed analysis of how the concept applies to one federal statute
in particular, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 19771 (SMCRA). Divided into several sections, this note first
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 522 [hereinafter SMCRA],
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982).
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discusses the background and origin of this area of the law.
Analysis proceeds with who may claim attorney fees and under
what circumstances. The discussion then analyzes how the courts
determine when it is appropriate to award the fee to a prevailing
litigant and what, in fact, is a reasonable fee. General principles
gleaned from the broad field of court-awarded attorney fees,
along with cases specifically dealing with SMCRA's fee shifting
provisions, are presented to guide the practitioner through a
complex and evolving area of the law.
1. BACKGROUND
Congress enacted SMCRA of 1977 to control and remedy
adverse social, economic and environmental effects of surface
coal mining operations. 2 The Secretary of the Department of
Interior is primarily responsible for administering and imple-
menting SMCRA3 and is obligated to take enforcement actions
against coal mine operators who have violated the many enforce-
ment provisions of the Act.
Recognizing that enforcement of the Act would be a complex
task, Congress enacted several provisions that allow citizens to
play an active role in enforcement. 4 As in other major federal
environmental legislation,' Congress provided an incentive for
active citizen involvement by enacting fee shifting6 provisions as
part of the SMCRA framework. 7 Fee shifting requires the loser
to pay the winner's attorneys fees; that is, it shifts the fee to
the loser. To understand the underlying theories and application
of these portions of SMCRA, one must understand the appli-
cation of fee shifting in the federal courts as the concept has
been applied in other contexts.
2 SMCRA § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (1982).
3 SMCRA § 201(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (1982).
4 SMCRA § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1982).
1 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976);
Toxic Substance Control Act § 19(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1218(d) (1982); Endangered Species
Act of 1973 § l l(g)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1982); Clean Air Act § 304(d), 307(f),
42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f) (Supp. IV 1982) (there are over 150 Federal Statutes
authorizing fee awards. See also Ruchelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 US 680 at 684 (1983)..
6 Fee shifting allows the court, in its discretion, to order the losing party to pay
the prevailing party's attorney fees.
I SMCRA § 520(d)-(e), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1270(d), 1275(e) (1982).
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A significant amount of jurisprudence underlies and is de-
veloping around the concept of fee shifting statutes since by
allowing the Court to award attorney fees to the winner, Con-
gress has expressly provided many statutory exceptions to the
American rule on attorney fees.8 Unlike the English rule, 9 the
American rule does not allow a prevailing litigant to recover an
attorney fee as part of his costs from the losing litigant. 0 One
theory behind the American rule is that since the result of
litigation is uncertain, one should not be penalized for "merely
defending or prosecuting a lawsuit."" Further, it has been ar-
gued that "the poor might be unjustly discouraged from insti-
tuting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing
included fees of their opponents' counsel." 2
Prior to 1964, 3 the American Rule was subject to only minor
exceptions 4 under the court's equity powers. In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, the federal courts adopted the "private attorney
I See Berger, Court Awarded Attorney, Fees: What is Reasonable?, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 281 (1977). The American Rule on attorneys fees requires each party to a
lawsuit to bear the cost of its own lawyer and leaves the matter of attorney fees to be
resolved in accordance with the contractual arrangement between lawyer and client.
9 In England Courts are authorized to award attorney fees to successful litigants.
After litigation of the merits, it is customary to conduct separate hearings in front of
"taxing masters" in order to determine the size and appropriate award of the attorneys'
Tee. See generally Fleishman Distilling Corporation v. Maier Brewing Company, 386
U.S. 714 (1967).
,0 Dobbs, A warding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem,
1986 DUKE L.J. 435 (1986) [hereinafter Dobbs].
1 386 U.S. at 718.
12 Id.
'" The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter Civil Rights Act], 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(k) (1982) marked the beginning of congressionally enacted departures
from the American rule.
'1 Two acknowledged common law exceptions where a losing party can be ordered
to pay the winner's attorney fee are: 1) The "common fund"/substantial benefit doc-
trine. See Central R.R. and Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885) and Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). See also Mills v. Elec. Autolite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
393-94 (1970) where the Court describes the "substantial benefit" conferred on members
of an ascertainable class and the court's award of attorneys fees is spread across the
class proportionately. This was not "fee shifting," but "fee spreading" under the courts
equity jurisdiction. 2) For the "bad faith" exception, see F.D. Rich Co. v. United States
ex. rel. Indust. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974). For an in-depth discussion of
the common law theories of recovering attorney fees, see Dobbs, supra note 10, at 435.
See also Shreve, Attorneys' Fee Awards to Complex Litigation Defendants: Striking a
Balance, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 613, 623 (1983).
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general"' 5 exception to the American rule. According to this
theory, those who vindicated their own civil rights were said to
have caused a benefit to all those whose rights were similarly
violated. These "private attorneys general" were entitled, there-
fore, to reimbursement for legal expenses.
16
The 1975 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Aleyska Pipeline
Services Co. v. Wilderness Society, 7 ended the expansion of the
private attorney general theory for attorney fee awards in the
federal courts.' 8 In Aleyska several environmental groups had
successfully halted construction of the Alaska pipeline, based on
violations of the Mineral Leasing Act and National Environ-
mental Policy Act. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
award of attorney fees to the environmental plaintiffs. The Court
held that "it would be inappropriate for the Judiciary, without
legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of litigation."' 9 It
did not take Congress long to react to the Aleyska decision's
invalidation of the private attorney general. 20 Congress passed
the Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Awards Act of 1976,21 which
expressly authorizes fee shifting.
22
A considerable amount of secondary litigation has resulted
from an increase in civil rights and class action litigation which
permit fee awards, and from legislation which authorizes fee
awards. 23 The way in which litigation is financed has also been
" See e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (plaintiff
who brings suit under Civil Rights Act does so not as individual but as a private attorney
general).
,6 Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorneys Fee
Awards Act, 80 COLO. L. REV. 346, 350 (1980).
17 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
81 See Comment, Implementing the Incentive Purpose of the Private Attorney
General Exception, 60 WASH. L. REV. 489 (1985) (private attorney general theory still
recognized in some states).
421 U.S. at 247.
o Comment, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club: Muddying The Waters of Fee-Shifting
in Federal Environmental Litigation, 1I PEPPERDINE L. REV. 441, 444 (1984).
11 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 [hereinafter Attorney's Fees
Act], 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970) (discussing the
"substantial benefit" exception in class actions). See also Dawson, Lawyers and Invol-
untary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARv. L. REV. 849, 869 (1975).
23 Dobbs, supra note 10, at 436. Further, practitioners should be aware that the
courts have made it clear that hours reasonably spent in establishing an entitlement to
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influenced by the practice of awarding attorney fees against
adversaries. 24 Since the adversary's usual response is to litigate
the fee claim itself, a major amount of litigation has forced the
courts to develop an entirely new area of jurisprudence on
attorney fee awards to the winner. As will be shown, all of these
areas of the law apply to SMCRA litigation when attorney fee
shifting is at issue.
Since SMCRA was passed in the shadow of Aleyska, Con-
gress expressly provided a statutory grant of fee shifting author-
ity to the courts and the administrative agency enforcing the
Act.25 The SMCRA practitioner, whether in-the public or private
sector, must be aware of the evolving jurisprudence in attorney
fee shifting or he may find himself exposed to large fees being
awarded against his client.
26
II. THE UMBRELLA OF FEDERAL FEE SHIFTING JURISPRUDENCE
Analysis must begin with the language of the statute.2 7 There
are two statutory sections of SMCRA which allow the court to
award attorney fees - the citizens suit 28 section and the judicial
review 29 section. Both sections are tied to principles of fee shift-
ing found in other federal statutes. Under its citizens suit pro-
vision (Section 1270(d)) the Act specifies:
The Court, in issuing any final order in any action brought
pursuant to subsection(a) of this section, may award costs of
litigation (including attorney and expert witness fees) to any
fees are compensable. Utah, Int'l, Inc. v. Dep't. of Interior, 643 F. Supp. 810, 831 (D.
Utah 1986); Hernandez v. George, 793 F.2d 264, 269 (10th Cir. 1986).
4 Dobbs, supra note 10, at 438.
25 SMCRA § 520(d)-(e), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1270(d), 1275(e) (1982).
16 See e.g., Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, 651 F. Supp. 1528 (D.D.C.
1986) (SOCM I), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 826 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (SOCM II)
(where plaintiffs in a suit to enforce the Act were awarded $147,670 in fees and costs
by the district court). (The case had been settled prior to litigation.).
27 Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1981) ("the starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself" citing Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)).
28 SMCRA § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1982).
2 9 SMCRA § 525, 30 U.S.C. § 1276 (1982).
1988]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
party, whenever the Court determines such award is appropri-
ate.30
This section of SMCRA is identical to sixteen other federal
statutes3 and has been relied upon by environmental plaintiffs
in several SMCRA cases against governmental agencies.
3 2
A second provision of SMCRA under the review by secretary
provision (Section 1275(e)) also allows fee shifting:
Whenever an order is issued under this section, or as the result
of any administrative proceeding under this Act, at the request
of any person, a sum equal to the aggregate amount of all
costs and expenses (including attorney fees) as determined by
the Secretary to be reasonably incurred by such person for or
in connection with his participation in such proceedings, in-
cluding any judicial review of agency actions, may be assessed
against either party as the court, resulting from judicial review
or The Secretary, resulting from administrative proceedings,
deems proper.33
30 SMCRA § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (1982).
Subsection (a) allows "any person having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected .. . [to] commence a civil action on his own behalf to compel compliance with
this Act." It should be noted that 30 U.S.C. § 1270(f) also refers to the award of
attorney fees: "520(f) any person who is injured in his person or property through the
violation by any operator of any rule, regulation, order or permit issued pursuant to
this Act may bring an action for damages (including reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees) only in the judicial district in which the surface coal mining operation
complained of is located." This subsection, though recognizing attorney fees, relates
primarily to venue. Id.
11 Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682 & n.1 (1983) (explaining § 307(f)
of the Clean Air Act, a fee shifting provision, and citing sixteen other acts with identical
language, including SMCRA).
32 See Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, 622 F. Supp. 1160 (D.D.C.
1985), modified, 651 F. Supp. 1528 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 826
F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Wildlife Federation v. Miller, 661 F. Supp. 473
(E.D. Ky. 1987).
13 SMCRA § 525(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e) (1982). Language of this section referring
to the award of attorney fees "as the result of any administrative proceeding" under
SMCRA has been narrowly interpreted to govern fees only in adversarial type enforce-
ment proceedings. This interpretation came in response to a request for fees arising in
a petition to declare lands unsuitable for mining under SMCRA section 522 (30 U.S.C.
§ 1272). Id. See Utah Int'l v. Dep't. of Interior, 643 F. Supp. 810, 821 (1986). See also
43 C.F.R. § 4.1290 for procedural requirements to claim attorney fees in administrative
actions under 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e).
[VOL. 4:159
ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING
Congress has given the courts wide discretion allowing fee
shifting when "appropriate" 3 4 and "proper."" The language of
each provision is vague. The legislative history does not provide
much light on the specific application, but it does illuminate the
broad purposes of fee shifting3 6 and links the fee shifting pro-
vision of SMCRA to the legislative umbrella covering other
federal statutes. One House Report specifies:
This [fee awards section of the Act] is intended to allow the
court to provide the traditional remedy of reasonable counsel
fee awards to private citizens who go to court to insure that
the act's requirements are being met. The provision will not
deter citizens acting as private attorneys general from bringing
good faith actions to insure the bill is being enforced by the
prospect of having to pay their opponent's counsel fees should
they lose. It is the committee's intention that this section be
construed consistently with the history of similar Federal sta-
tutes providing for award of attorneys fees in citizen suit
actions .17
The courts, in construing the fee shifting sections of SMCRA,
have linked its purpose and application to the broader federal
jurisprudence of fee shifting. Judge Bork, writing for the D.C.
Circuit had occasion to address the subject of Save Our Cum-
berland Mountains v. HodePs (SOCM II) when he found that:
[Tihe Supreme Court has found that an indentically worded
fee statute in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1982),
34 SMCRA § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (1982).
3, SMCRA § 525(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e) (1982).
36 See S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 88 (1977): "The Committee believes
that citizen suits can play an important role in assuring that regulatory agencies and
surface operators comply with the requirements of the Act and approved regulatory
programs. The possibility of a citizen suit should help to keep program administrators
'on their toes.' " S. REP. No. 284, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 81 (1977) (Citizen suits under
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act should help to keep program administrators "on
their toes." Obviously Congress wants all agencies "on their toes.")
11 H.R. RaP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1977). Citing S. REP. No. 414,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADWN. NEws 3747 (Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972); SENATE REPORT No. 451, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4249 (Marine Protection
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972).
1 Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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should be interpreted in accord with the more abundant juris-
prudence addressing the attorney's fee provision in The Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), and other statutes that
award a 'reasonable' attorneys fee to a 'prevailing party.'3 9
In SOCM 11, the Court was reviewing the citizen suit fee shifting
provision of Section 1270(d).
Courts have also found Section 1275(e) cases related to ju-
dicial and administrative review to come under the umbrella of
the Clean Air Act fee shifting decisions and are, therefore, linked
to the Civil Rights Act attorney fee jurisprudence. In Utah
International v. Department of Interior,40 fees were requested by
petitioners pursuant to section 1275(e) .4 The district court held
that guidance as to what constitutes a "proper" award under
this fee shifting provision is contained in Sierra Club v. Ruck-
elshaus.42 In Ruckelshaus, a Clean Air Act case, the Supreme
Court addressed the appropriateness of awarding attorney fees
under fee statutes similar to SMCRA section 1275(e).
43
Administrative agencies have also addressed the topic. The
Interior Board of Land Appeals in Donald St. Clair" held that
Ruckelshaus applies to SMCRA section 1275(e) as well as section
1270(d). In a lengthly opinion laced with legislative history, the
Board avoided the potential for confusion between the two
sections by holding that both are controlled by the same prin-
ciples. Judge Burski, concurring, summarized as follows: "I
think it clear that Congress intended the same standards to apply
in adjudications under either section and thus, the Supreme
Court's decisions in Ruckelshaus on the scope of section [1270(d)]
must be considered equally controlling as to the scope of section
[1275(e)]."
4 5
In another recent decision, Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens Council for Clean Air, the Supreme Court has noted
19 Id. at 47, citing Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean
Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
, 643 F. Supp. 810 (D. Utah 1986).
4 Id. at 816.
,2 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
41 643 F. Supp. at 816 (1986) (discussing 463 U.S. 680 (1983)) (the similar fee
statute is The Clean Air Act § 307(0).
- 92 Interior Dec. 1 (1985).
41 Id. at 13.
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that, "given the common purpose of both § 304 [of the Clean
Air Act] and § 1988 [of the Civil Rights Act] .. .we find no
reason not to interpret both provisions governing attorney's fees
in the same manner."
'46
Therefore, since both of SMCRA's fee statutes47 have been
interpreted in light of the Clean Air Act fee decisions, they are
also found under the jurisprudential umbrella of the legislative
history and judicial decisions surrounding the Civil Rights Act.
An attorney contemplating attorney fee requests must be aware
of the evolving law under both environmental statutes and civil
rights litigation. This concept makes sense if the courts are to
have one body of law applicable to federal fee shifting statutes.
III. FEE SHIFTING UNDER SMCRA
A. The Parties
1. Plaintiffs/Defendants
The Citizen suit section 1270(d) fee shifting provision allows
the court to award attorney fees "to any party." 48 On its face,
therefore, Section 1270(d) appears to allow either plaintiff or
defendant an equal opportunity to recover fees. The review by
Secretary section 1275(e) fee shifting provision contains the phrase
"against either party," 49 which leads to the same conclusion.
However, not all parties in litigation stand in the same position
to obtain their attorney fees even though the Act specifies award
of fees when "appropriate or proper." The scales are tipped in
favor of plaintiffs.
Although Congress used facially-neutral language in the stat-
ute its intent to shield plaintiffs can be discerned from the
committee report accompanying the bill 0:
"' 478 U.S. at 560.
41 SMCRA § 520(d)-(e), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1270(d), 1275(e) (1982).
"' SMCRA § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (1982).
,9 SMCRA § 525, 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e) (1982).
50 H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. 90 (1977) (citations omitted). The
reporter cites inter alia, Carrion v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976);
Wright v. Stone Container Corporation, 524 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1975), United States
Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 1975).
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Thus, it is the Committee's intention that this provision [1270(d)]
be construed consistently with the general principle that an
award may be made to a defendant only if the plaintiff has
instituted the action solely 'to harass or embarrass' the defen-
dant. If the plaintiff is 'motivated by malice and vindictiveness'
then the court may award counsel fees to the prevailing defen-
dant. Thus, if the action is not brought in bad faith, such fees
should not be allowed."
The Department of Interior, in administrative actions, uses
the same standard in denying defendants recovery of attorney
fees under section 1275(e). In Dennis R. Patrick,5 2 the Interior
Board of Surface Mining Appeals held that "petitioner must
show that OSM initiated its enforcement action against him in
bad faith and for the purpose of harassing or embarrassing him
in order to recover against OSM." 53
Federal regulations define the standard that is used when a
permittee seeks attorney fees from the regulatory authority:
Appropriate costs and expenses including attorney's fees may
be awarded to a permittee from OSM when the permittee
demonstrates that OSM issued an order of cessation, a notice
of violation or an order to show cause why a permit should
not be suspended or revoked, in bad faith and for the purpose
of harassing or embarrassing the permittee .. .4
This bad faith standard was challenged in Alternate Fuels,
Inc. v. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforce-
ment.55 Alternate Fuels appealed the denial of an award of fees
incurred in defending a test case. At issue was OSM's authority
to regulate the company after the release of bonds by the state
regulatory authority. Alternate Fuels argued that section 1275(e)
does not require a demonstration of bad faith by OSM as a
condition to an award of attorney fees to a coal operator.16 The
appellant argued that the adoption of the bad faith standard
H.R. RaP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. 90 (1977).
52 86 Interior Dec. 450; see also Delta Mining Corp., 88 Interior Dec. 742 (1981).
" Id. at 451. See also 88 Interior Dec. 742.
43 C.F.R. § 4.1294(c).
103 I.B.L.A. 187 (July 21, 1988).
56 Id. at 189.
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was a misreading of legislative history, and that the standard
was intended to apply to private parties harassing coal compa-
nies.17 Although acknowledging the arguments, the Interior Board
of Land Appeals chose not to delve into the legislative history
and rationale behind the rule. The A.L.J. noted, "It is not our
province to weigh the merits of these contrasting views of the
legislative history of Section [1276(e)]." 58 The A.L.J. interpreted
the arguments as a challenge to the validity of the regulation
and acknowledged that the I.B.L.A. did not have jurisdiction to
entertain a challenge to the reguations.5 9
The bad faith standard does create a double standard as the
Alternate Fuels opinion indicates. It seems imperative that if
federal fee shifting jurisprudence is to be defined by one body
of law, the bad faith standard must be reviewed. Recent Clean
Air Act attorney fee award decisions do not require private
corporations to show bad faith on the part of government for
an award of fees. In Florida Power and Light v. Costle,60 the
Fifth Circuit awarded attorney fees to Florida Power and Light
against E.P.A. even though the utility company was a solvent
private corporation. It seems fundamentally unfair for one in-
dustry to meet a bad faith standard under SMCRA while another
industry meets a lesser standard under the Clean Air Act. This
is especially true since SMCRA and other fee shifting statutes
have been interpreted in light of the Clean Air Act.
6'
This bad faith standard implies that neither Congress nor
the Courts want to deter plaintiffs from bringing valid citizen
suits for fear of having attorney fees assessed against them.
However, the burden placed on an innocent defendant is almost
impossible to overcome since even a shard of evidence will tilt
the balance in favor of the plaintiff. This rule in fee shifting
jurisprudence has been identified as the "one way fee shifting
rule." ' 62 There have been constitutional challenges to such sta-
tutes, but these seem to have subsided in the wake of judicial
11 Id. at 190.
58 Id.
19 Id.
683 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1982).
6, See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
61 Dobbs, supra note 10, at 449.
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approval of one-way fee awards under the civil rights statutes. 63
This fact, along with the momentum of the overall policy behind
citizen suits and fee shifting64 puts an even stronger duty on the
defense counsel to be aware of the law regarding fee shifting
since it cuts sharply against defendants.
2. Intervenors
Fee shifting cases arise when a third party intervenes in
litigation in order to advance the defendant's argument. This is
particularly true in SMCRA litigation where industry organiza-
tions have intervened in suits brought by environmental plaintiffs
against state and federal regulatory agencies 65 based on a claim
of lax agency enforcement. Since an intervenor is not the party
who actually violated the plaintiff's rights, one must wonder if
a defendant intervenor should be considered a losing party when
the plaintiff prevails and should therefore be subject to paying
plaintiff's attorney fees. Some commentators say no. 66 However,
several cases have held intervenors liable for attorney fees.
67
63 Id. at 448.
- See Berger, supra note 8 at 308-09. Congress has two objectives in enacting fee
shifting statutes: 1) To achieve the fullest possible voluntary compliance with statutory
duties by imposing a private remedy that is readily available, and 2) To enable those
who have been aggrieved by a violation of the statute to vindicate their rights, both for
themselves and, acting as private attorneys general, for others similarly situated.
63 See Motion of Coal Operators and Assoc., Ky. Coal Ass'n, Knott-Letcher-Perry
Independent Coal Operators Ass'n, Inc., Western Ky. Coal Ass'n, Mining and Recla-
mation Council of America, Nat'l Coal Ass'n, American Mining Congress, to Intervene
as Defendants, National Wildlife Federation and Ky. Resources Council v. Baldwin,
Civil Action No. 86-99 (E.D. Ky. 1986); see also Memorandum of Law in Support of
Industry Intervenors Application to Intervene as Defendants, National Wildlife Federa-
tion and Kentucky Resources Council, Inc. v. Hodel, Civil Action No. 86-169 (E.D. Ky.
1986). Intervenors included Nat'l Coal Ass'n, American Mining Congress, Mining and
Reclamation Council of America, Coal Operators and Assoc., Harlan County Coal
Operators Ass'n, Knott-Perry Independent Coal Operators Ass'n, Inc., Western Ky.
Coal Ass'n, Facts About Coal in Tenn., Ill. Coal Ass'n, Ind. Coal Council, Ohio Coal
and Energy Ass'n, Ohio Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Pa. Coal Mining Ass'n, W.
Va. Mining and Reclamation Ass'n.
I Dobbs, supra note 10, at 455.
67 Id., at n. 146. See also Charles v. Daley, Civil Action Nos. 79C 4541 and 79
4547 (7th Cir. May 5, 1987) (Pro life public interest group intervened on behalf of
Illinois and took case to U.S. Supreme Court when state declined to pursue the case
further. Fees of $206,000 were awarded to A.C.L.U. against American United for Life
Defense Fund); Zipes v. Transworld Airlines, Civil Action No. 86-2731 (7th Cir. May
6, 1987) (intervening labor union assessed $180,000).
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The possibility of having attorney fees assessed against them
has caused concern for defendant intervenors and has in fact
chilled their involvement in SMCRA litigation .6  The implica-
tions of this fear are obvious. Parties who may be directly or
indirectly affected by the outcome of litigation and who have
standing to intervene and the financial capacity to litigate the
issues fully, will choose to take an amicus stance rather than
full party status.
The issue of intervenor attorney fees has also been addressed
in Utah International, Inc. v. Department of Interior.69 Inter-
venor Sierra Club aligned itself with the U.S. Department of
Interior in defending the government's designation of lands un-
suitable for mining. Sierra Club then sought attorney fees, costs
and expenses from the government. The district court was being
asked to award fees from one prevailing party to another pre-
vailing party. The court would not award fees from similarly
aligned prevailing parties.
The court did address the issue of whether intervenors could
recover fees from a nonprevailing party. 70 The court noted in
such an instance (intervenor collecting fee from nonprevailing
party) the court must examine the particular role played by the
intervenor. According to Donnell v. United States, an intervenor
should be awarded attorney fees only if it contributed substan-
tially to the success of the litigation.7 The first thing that must
be determined is whether the government litigant adequately
represented the intervenor's interests by diligently defending the
suit. Other considerations include whether the intervenor's the-
ories and arguments were different from those of the original
parties and whether the work it performed was valuable to the
court 72
Intervenors, therefore, are also influenced by fee shifting
statutes. Defendant intervenors may be subject to plaintiff's fees.
"' Interview with Richard Ward, Partner, Wyatt, Tarrant and Combs, Lexington,
Ky. (Feb. 16, 1987) discussing intervenors decision to retreat from litigation involvement
in National Wildlife Federation v. Baldwin, Civil Action No. 86-99 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
69 Utah Int'l Inc. v. Dep't of Interior, 643 F. Supp. 810 (D. Utah 1986).
70 Id. at 818-19 (citing Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
11 682 F.2d at 247.
71 Id. at 248-49.
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Plaintiff intervenors may recover against a defendant if they
propose divergent theories and prevail. An unsuspecting defen-
dant in such a position may find himself at substantial risk if
plaintiff intervenors enter the case on their own theories.
B. Eligibility to Claim Fees
1. Substantive Requirements - The Party Must Prevail
Some authors have suggested that the failure to restrict awards
to prevailing parties in environmental statutes is an indication
that Congress did not intend to authorize awards only to parties
who prevail on the merits." The argument in favor of not
limiting fees to prevailing parties is that a losing party may, by
bringing suit, provide litigation that clarifies the law, thus fur-
thering the goals of the statute.7 4 This rationale was supported
by several environmental cases in the early 1980s which inter-
preted language similar to that found in SMCRA.
7
1
SMCRA allows the court discretion to award fees in citizen
suits "whenever the court determines such award is appropriate"
76
and "against either party ... as the court deems proper '' T7 in
administrative actions. With no Congressional guidance78 to stan-
darize when it is "appropriate" or "proper," some federal
courts have used language similar to that found in federal sta-
tutes in order to allow fees to both prevailing and nonprevailing
parties.79 It was this broad discretion that formed the basis of
the controversy in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club.80
71 Note, Award of Attorney Fees to Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants, 96
HARv. L. REV. 677, 681 (1983).
7, Id. at 683.
7 See e.g., Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 684 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curium)
(award of $91,000 attorney fees for unsuccessful litigation since it "clarified" the Clean
Air Act and other issues). See also, N. Plains Resources Council v. EPA, 670 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1982).
76 SMCRA § 520(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (1982).
7 SMCRA § 525(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e) (1982).
71 See Note, Award of Attorney Fees in Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
277, 331-32 (1982) (discussing lack of Congressional guidance).
79 Supra note 75. See also Comment, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club: Muddying the
Waters of Fee Shifting in Federal Environmental Litigation, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
441, 445 (1984).
- 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
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The relevant issue in Ruckelshaus was "whether it is 'appro-
priate' within the meaning of § 307(f) of the Clean Air Act,"
[a statute almost identical to SMCRA section 1270(d)] "to award
attorney's fees to a party that achieved no success on the merits
of its claims." 81 The Supreme Court noting the traditional Amer-
ican rule, concluded that some success on the merits must be
obtained before a party becomes eligible for a fee award. 2 This
standard begs the question, how much success on the merits is
required before a party prevails?
A typical formulation is that plaintiffs may be considered
"prevailing" parties for attorney fees purposes if they succeed
on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit. 3 Most federal courts
have used this generous formulation to give the plaintiff pre-
vailing party status.8 4 A few courts use a more stringent standard
that makes the plaintiff prevail on the primary or central issue.8 5
In Ruckelshaus, after a lengthy analysis of statutes that use the
word "prevailing," and those that merely note "when appro-
priate," the Court opened the door to plaintiffs who partially
prevail: "Section 307(f) was meant to expand the class of parties
eligible for fee awards from prevailing parties to partially pre-
vailing parties-parties achieving some success, even if not major
success. "'86
The court was quick to note that trivial success on the merits
or purely procedural victories would not be "appropriate" for
any award of attorney fees. 7 A plaintiff, therefore, can prevail
if he achieves only some relief sought, loses more issues than he
wins, or obtains only one remedy when several are demanded.88
Ruckelshaus determines when an award of fees is proper under
s, Id., at 682.
82 Id.
13 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (citing Nadeau v. Helgemoe,
581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (lst Cir. 1978)).
14 Dobbs, supra note 10, at 450.
1, 461 U.S. at 433; Dobbs, supra note 10, at 444.
16 463 U.S. at 688 (emphasis in original).
11 Id., at n. 9.
88 Dobbs, supra note 10, at 450 (citing Mires v. Shopp, 744 F.2d 946, 955 (3d Cir.
1984)).
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SMCRA.8 9 In a SMCRA suit which covers many issues, the
defendant may feel as though he prevailed substantially, but he
nevertheless may be subject to his opponent's attorney fees for
any issues on which the plaintiff obtained some relief. It is now
clear that a plaintiff can be considered a prevailing party even
if the case is settled, provided that some of the relief sought is
obtained. 90 The rule has even encompassed an award of fees for
time outside of litigation spent on activities that served as a
"catalyst" or contributing factor to the result sought. 9' A de-
fendant in the latter instance, therefore, may be subject to fees
which were totally unforseeable. In most cases the award will be
unpredictable.
2. Fees For Monitoring Compliance
In the context of settlements or consent decrees, many courts
have provided that post-judgement monitoring is a compensable
activity for which counsel is entitled to a fee. 92 The Supreme
Court recognized in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens
Council93 (Delaware Valley I), that awarding fees for monitoring
consent decrees was appropriate in civil rights cases94 and adopted
the principle under the Clean Air Act section 304. It is therefore
appropriate to SMCRA cases. The Ninth Circuit recently upheld
the concept in Keith v. Volpe.95
In Keith an environmental/public interest coalition 96 brought
suit against the Federal Highway Administration and the Cali-
19 Utah Int'l Inc. v. Dep't of Interior, 643 F. Supp. 810 (D. Utah 1986); see also
Donald St. Clair, 92 Interior Dec. 1, 84 I.B.L.A. 236 (1985). See supra notes 40-45 and
accompanying text.
90 Dobbs, supra note 10 at 451. See also Save Our Cumberland Mountains v.
Hodel, 826 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (final settlement of the action on the merits resulted
in an award of $140,670).
11 826 F.2d 51 (citing Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 915, 919 (D.C.
Cir. 1983)).
91 Pa. v. Del. Valley Citizens Council, 478 U.S. 546, 559 (1986) (citing Garrity v.
Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 738-739 (1st Cir. 1984)); Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1233
(7th Cir. 1980); Miller v. Curson, 628 F.2d 346, 348 (5th Cir. 1980); Northcross v.
Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 637 (6th Cir. 1979).
93 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
9 Attorneys' Fees Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
91 Keith v. Volpe, 833 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1987).
" NAACP, Sierra Club, Environmental Defense Fund and Freeway Fighters.
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fornia Department of Transportation (Caltran) to halt construc-
tion of the Century Freeway in southern California. After seven
years of study, negotiations and planning, the parties reached a
settlement designed to allow the project to proceed. 97 A consent
decree was approved by the District Court. An initial award of
attorney fees was granted, but it was not the end of attorney
fee litigation. Plaintiffs sought additional fees for an amended
consent order and were awarded $292,939.98 Two years later the
plaintiffs sought supplemental attorney fees. The Court stated
that it had "reserved jurisdiction to award supplemental attorney
fees" 99 and that the monitoring work done by plaintiffs was
similar to work previously found to be compensable. The Court
allowed fees and expenses of $407,400. Caltran appealed this
award. It argued, inter alia, that there was no violation of the
consent decree, thus no contempt, and therefore no reason to
award fees since there was no litigation. The Ninth Circuit, citing
Garrity v. Sununu,1°° held that a finding of contempt or obstruc-
tion is not a prerequisite for a fee award for post-judgment
monitoring activities and upheld the award. The court noted
"we do not think that extreme tension and animosity are pre-
conditions to a fee award of this sort."'' ° In other words, full-
fledged litigation is not a prerequisite to recovering fee awards.
Fees for monitoring consent decrees or court orders should
be considered by the defendant in "upfront" negotiations with
plaintiffs, otherwise the defendant may be shocked when the
plaintiff seeks fees at some future time. Just such a litigation
surprise occurred in National Wildlife Federation v. Miller,0 2 a
SMCRA case. In a challenge by the National Wildlife Federation
to Kentucky's enforcement policies under its permanent regula-
tory program, the defendant, the state of Kentucky, "settled"
with the plaintiffs. The National Wildlife Federation received
$181,071 in attorney fees. Following the settlement, litigation
ensued in National Wildlife Federation v. Miller. The issues were
91 833 F.2d at 852.
" Id. at 853.
" Id.
I 752 F.2d at 739.
10, 833 F.2d at 857.
102 National Wildlife Federation v. Miller, No. 86-99 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
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whether the plaintiffs should receive fees of $222,548 for mon-
itoring the settlement; $90,535 for risk of losing the case (and
hence receiving no fee) and $11,651 for preparing arguments for
the additional fees. 103 The district court was not as generous as
the Keith court. Judge Bertelsman denied the request. He found,
inter alia, that there was "no meeting of the minds"' ' ° between
plaintiffs and the state of Kentucky regarding fees for monitor-
ing the settlement agreement. An extra layer of litigation can be
prevented if the defendants are aware of the possibility of future
fees and make such fees an issue in negotiating the settlement
agreement.
The prevailing party analysis is a generous formulation, but
it only brings the plaintiff across the statutory threshold. It
remains for the district court to determine what fee is "reason-
able."'' 5 How the court determines a reasonable fee is analyzed
in the following discussions.
IV. DETERMINING A REASONABLE FEE
Determining what is a reasonable fee has produced massive
amounts of secondary litigation and continues to be an evolving
area of the law. The courts have developed so many variables
for analysis that attorneys have found many issues to litigate.'
°6
Secondary litigation has in turn engendered criticism which fo-
,o Id. In oral argument, state attorneys argued that "[these plaintiffs attorneys
are trying to get a $500,000 fee for a case that never went beyond discovery .... "
"Who will guard the guardians - They will have a cornucopia of hours." Statements of
Mr. Lawrence Forgy, Counsel for Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet, January 29, 1988. From author's notes of oral arguments before
Judge Bertelsman.
,o See Order, No. 86-99 (E.D. Ky. July 15, 1987). The Court also noted that
minimal monitoring would be required by plaintiffs since most, if not all, monitoring
be conducted by federal agencies. The Court also required the plaintiffs to give written
notice at least ten days prior to the rendition of any future services for which plaintiffs
counsel would contemplate seeking attorney fees. Id.
105 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).
1 Among the many variables that have been the focus of major litigation include:
1) What are reasonable hours? 2) What is a reasonable rate? 3) Should there be a
multiplier for risk of loss? 4) Should there be a multiplier for high quality? 5) What
factors should be considered? 6) Should interest be allowed? 7) Should there be additional
fees due to delay? 8) What is a reasonable multiplier? 9) There is almost no end to the
questions that can be litigated. The problem is, how does the court answer them with
consistency when the answers are amorphous?
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cuses on the excessiveness of fees, the disproportionality of
awards and the burdens placed on the judicial system. 0 7 SMCRA
litigation is a prime example. Save Our Cumberland Mountains
v. Hodel10° illustrates the point. Citizens groups brought suit
under section 1270(d) of the Act, alleging that the Department
of Interior improperly failed to enforce SMCRA's "two acre
exemption."' 9 They also alleged violations of the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). The district court dismissed the SMCRA
challenge for lack of venue and the APA challenge on mootness,
due to a supervening rule.110 A panel of the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed. Thereafter, the full court vacated the pa-
nel's opinion and agreed to rehear the venue issue en banc.
Before the rehearing, the parties settled the issues on appeal. On
remand, the venue defense was waived by the Department of
Interior and the parties settled the action on the merits."' This
is the starting point of the secondary litigation regarding attorney
fees.
Plaintiffs had applied to district court under section 1270(d)
for an award of attorney fees and were granted $147,670.112 The
government appealed on several issues including the reasonable-
ness of the attorney's rate. The D.C. Circuit reviewed the case
and the many variables and broad jurisprudence underlying at-
torney fees in light of fee shifting statutes. Judge Bork showed
the court's disdain for complex secondary judicial review of
attorney fees when he stated succinctly, "Judicial award of
attorneys' fees under a statutory scheme such as that here un-
comfortably resembles judicial ratemaking."113 Nevertheless, the
court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's
award. The plaintiff's petition for rehearing was granted en
banc. 1 14 This secondary litigation regarding the computation of
attorney fees is, therefore, in its third iteration. When contrasted
Dobbs, supra note 10, at 436.
826 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
SMCRA § 528, 30 U.S.C. § 1278(2) (repealed 1987) (This section exempted coal
operators who mined two acres or less from the regulatory aspects of SMCRA.).
110 826 F.2d at 46.
826 F.2d at 45, 46 (describing the case history).
H Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
826 F.2d at 54.
11 830 F.2d at 1182.
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to the fact that the merits were never litigated, the case illustrates
why this type of litigation has been severely criticized.
Attorneys appear to the general public to be acting with
impropriety. There is a public resentment of perceived unwar-
ranted fees"5 and there have been overt accusations of "churn-
ing."1 1 16 Of course laymen cannot be expected to realize that
there is an underlying complex jurisprudence regarding fee shift-
ing. Nevertheless, with today's public perception of lawyers as
unscrupulous, the continued litigation regarding fees, accompa-
nied by the concomitant self-laudation to justify the fees, can
only foster public resentment.
Although secondary litigation regarding fees is unpopular,
the fact that it exists is not surprising since Congress provides
no standard by which to measure the fee. Congress has, in
essence, created a market for plaintiff's attorneys and it is going
to take some time and litigation to determine how the market
will work."17 It takes extensive litigation to establish a method
for computing fees. "Courts have struggled to formulate the
proper measure for determining the 'reasonableness' of a partic-
ular fee award""'  and there have been nearly as many ap-
proaches to the issue as there are judges."l 9 The evolving
methodology for determining the fee is presented in the following
discussions, which illustrate the struggle facing courts as they
establish standards for reasonable fees.
A. The Concept and Evolution of "Lodestar"
An early case in fee shifting jurisprudence, Johnson v. Geor-
gia Highway Express,'2 0 relied on the American Bar Association
"I See Lexington Herald-Leader, October 16, 1987 at A12, Col. 1. ("The attorneys
are asking $72,598 compensation for the risk of losing this case. Say What? Compen-
sation for the risk of losing a case that has, already been settled in the attorneys favor?
Uh, pardon us, but where's the risk? ...And we thought these were the good guys.")
(editorial regarding National Wildlife Federation v. Baldwin, No. 96-99 (E.D. Ky. 1986)).
6 National Wildlife Federation v. Miller, No. 86-99 (E.D. Ky. 1986) (Statements
at oral arguments made by Mr. Lawrence Forgy, attorney for defendants.).
'" Telephone interview with Will Irvin, Chief Admin. Law Judge of the Interior
Board of Land Appeals, in Arlington, Virginia (April 20, 1988).
I' See Pa. v. Del. Valley Citizens Council, 478 U.S. 546, 562 (1986) (Delaware
Valley I).
,, Berger, supra note 8, at 284.
488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Code of Professional Responsibility 21 in determining how to set
a reasonable fee. The court listed twelve factors that needed to
be considered. 12 2 Many courts adopted the Johnson method and
the case was cited with approval by Congress when the Attorneys
Fee Awards Act 23 was passed. 2 4 Congress, by referring to John-
son in the legislative history, established the standard bearer for
fee determinations. 25 The method had no analytical framework
and it gave very little guidance to district courts. Therefore,
what was a predominantly subjective determinative gave the
courts unlimited discretion in determining reasonable fees.126 A
few circuits interpreted Johnson as an invitation to further con-
fusion and adopted a particular analytical framework to be used
by lower courts in determining fees.127 The Third Circuit came
up with the breakthrough in Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.
2 1
Lindy defined the "lodestar" approach. The approach is a
two step process. The first step multiplies the reasonable hours
spent on the case by a reasonable hourly rate of compensation
for each attorney on the case - thus, the lodestar. In the second
step, the lodestar figure is then "adjusted" in light of a) the
... MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B) (1980).
"I The 12 factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty
of the question; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the
preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed
by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9)
the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the "undesireability" of the
case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12)
awards in similar cases. 478 U.S. at 562, n. 7. See Citizens For Responsible Resource
Dev. v. Watt, 579 F. Supp. 431, 444-48 (M.D. Ala. N.D. 1983), where a citizens group
challenged Secretary of Interiors approval of the Alabama Surface Mining and Control
Act and sought attorney fees under Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. §
2412. The Court after finding EAJA an appropriate tool for seeking fees as opposed to
SMCRA fee shifting provisions, relied on the Johnson factors to find an award of
$7,140.00 (102 hours x $70/hour). 579 F. Supp. at 444-48.
23 Attorneys' Fees Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess.
25 Note, Civil Rights Attorneys Fees: Hensleys Path to Confusion, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 363 (1986).
116 478 U.S. at 563.
"I Berger, supra note 8, at 287.
28 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3rd Cir. 1973) (Lindy I).
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contingent nature of the case 129 (reflecting the likelihood that
hours and expenses were incurred without assurance of compen-
sation) and b) the quality of the work performed (as evidenced
by the work observed, the complexity of the issues and the
recovery obtained).' 3° Even though Lindy provided a more ana-
lytical framework, its subjectivity led to divergent results., 3 Any
attempt to discern a rational basis for the dramatic variation in
these cases - based upon the difficulty of the case, its impor-
tance to the public, or even the hours devoted by the attorneys
- is fruitless.'
3 2
1. Reasonable Hours/Results Obtained
The Supreme Court, recognizing that the fee setting ap-
proaches taken by varying courts were still producing inconsis-
tent and arbitrary fee awards, promulgated the reasonable fee
analysis in Hensley v. Eckerhart.33 The Court adopted an ap-
proach it later described as a hybrid of the Johnson and lodestar
methods.' 34 "The most useful starting point for determining ...
a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on
the litigation multiplied by the reasonably hourly rate." '35 The
Court provided an objective basis for the determination of a
lawyer's value, and also put the burden on the party seeking
fees to submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates
claimed. 3 6 If a prevailing party does not adequately document
his hours, or the hours are not "reasonably expended," under
"I The "contingent" factor is a remnant of the "Johnson test" and MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBI.ITY DR 1-106(6) and reflects the likelihood that the attorney
will not prevail and hence receive no remuneration at all. It is also referred to as the
"risk of loss" factor.
' Lindy Brothers v. American Raditor, 540 F.2d 102, 117 (3rd Cir. 1976) (Lindy
II).
"' See Berger supra note 8, at 288, 289, n. 34 (author analysis of many cases shows
court awarded attorney fee adjustments ranging from 5%-400076).
,12 Id. at 289.
113 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
,1 Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. 546, 564-65.




Hensley the district court should reduce the award accordingly.'
Thus, it is incumbent on a defendant, if subject to pay his
opponent's attorneys fee, to determine if the fees are excessive,
redundant or otherwise unnecessary.'
38
The Hensley court added another aspect that a lower court
may review in the fee determination. Noting that the lodestar is
the basis, the Court recognized that "[T]he district court should
focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the
plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the
litigation.' ' 9 The Court also approved an enhancement of the
award for exceptional success '40 or a lowering for poor success.'
4'
The result, according to Hensley, is what matters.'
42
Inherent in the "results obtained" determination is the ques-
tion whether a party may be awarded fees for claims that did
not succeed. The Court held that "an unsuccessful claim cannot
be deemed to have been 'expended in pursuit of the ultimate
result achieved' . . . and therefore no fee may be awarded for
services on the unsuccessful claim." 43 Conversely, how does the
court adjust the award for successful results obtained? The Court
specified that there is no precise rule or formula to follow in
making the determination and that the equitable judgment is
within the district court's discretion.'" The district court is sub-
ject to reversal, however, if it does not clearly explain the
relationship between the award and the results obtained.'1
5
Id. at 434 (citing Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (1980) (en banc).
Cases may be overstaffed and the skill and experience of lawyers vary
widely. Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort
to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or,
otherwise unnecessary. Hours that are not properly billed to one's client




'0 461 U.S. at 434. See also Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (en banc). It does not follow that the amount of time actually expended is the
amount of time reasonably expended. In the private sector "billing judgment" is an
important component in fee setting. It is no less important here.
"1 461 U.S. at 435.
142 Id.
" Id. However, if the unsuccessful claim is frivolous, the defendant may recover
attorney fees incurred in responding to it. See Id. at 438 n. 13.
1" 461 U.S. at 436-37.
,41 Id. at 437.
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In Hensley the Supreme Court would not affirm the lower
court's award because the opinion did not properly consider the
relationship between the extent of success and the amount of
the fee award.' 46 Recent SMCRA-related decisions have recog-
nized the district court's discretion and have recognized that the
appellate courts are limited to a review of whether the lower
court applied improper legal standards or abused its discretion.' 47
The relationship between the extent of success and the fee
award is not a precise calculation and involves remnants of the
subjective Johnson factors. It has been subject to criticism.'
48
Recognizing this, the Supreme Court addressed the topic again
in Blum v. Stenson149 and refined the analysis.
2. Reasonable Rate
In Blum v. Stenson, the Court addressed what is a "reason-
able rate," that is, the second half of the lodestar determination,
and it also refined the "adjustment" methodology. In Blum, a
nonprofit law organization sued the New York State Department
of Social Services. After prevailing, the plaintiff attorneys sought
an award of fees under 42 U.S.C. section 1988. The district
court awarded fees based on the prevailing "market rate" for
attorneys as opposed to the salaried rates of these attorneys.
New York, forty states, and the United States as amicus curiae,
argued that attorney fees under section 1988 should be calculated
according to the cost of providing legal services in order to avoid
windfalls to non-profit legal aid organization. 10 A unanimous
Court, reaching into the legislative history, found that Congress
did not intend the calculation of fee awards to vary depending
on whether the plaintiff was represented by private counsel or
by a nonprofit legal services organization.' 5 '
, Id. at 438.
,,' Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 43, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
141 See Note, supra note 125 at 374-76 (1986) (citing several cases where fees were
reduced for unsuccessful claims using Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) as a
basis).
--9 465 U.S. 886 (198 ).




Reasonable fees, therefore, are not to be calculated according
to the prevailing market rate in the relevant community1 2 re-
gardless of whether the plaintiff is represented by private or non-
profit counsel.' In a footnote, the Court recognized the inherent
difficulty of determining "market rate ' 15 4 and put the burden
on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence that he is
worth what he is charging.' The market rate issue has also been
addressed in a SMCRA fee shifting case, Save Our Cumberland
Mountains v. Hodel'5 6(SOCM II).
In SOCM II the D.C. Circuit lowered an attorney's rate
from $150.00/hr to $100.00/hr. The court held that in order to
avoid a judicial evaluation of the market, reasonable hourly
rates may be based on a comparison to rates charged in private
representation. However, if an attorney has a customary billing
rate, that rate will be the presumptively reasonable rate. 5 7 Some
courts have referred to this rate as the "historical billing rate.'
5 8
Until recently in the D.C. Circuit, only if the attorney had no
customary billing rate could the court base its fee award on a
composite average market hourly rate. 59 This rule came from
the D.C. Circuit in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines.
16 ° Laffey 6'
provided a precise determination of an attorney's fee and it has
been acclaimed for cutting down on secondary attorney fee
litigation and ease of administration.
As a prime example of the evolving nature in this area of
the law, Laffey's precision requiring the court to use historical
,12 This community standard presents an interesting question. What if an attorney
from an "expensive" community, i.e., Washington, D.C., litigates a case in a compar-
atively inexpensive community, e.g., Frankfort, Kentucky? Which community rate pre-
vails?
465 U.S. at 895.
Id. at 897 n. 14.
Id. (Evidence includes the attorney's own affidavits and other information
showing the rate is in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services
by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.).
" Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 43, 47 (1986).
11 Id. at 47 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)).
Is Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Dep't of Interior, 643 F. Supp. 810, 829-30 (1986).
119 826 F. Supp. at 47-48 (citing Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).
1' Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
,6, 746 F.2d at 18.
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billing rates when they exist recently came under review in the
latest iteration of Save Our Cumberland Mountains (SOCM
III).162 In this oft-litigated case the D.C. Circuit en banc ad-
dressed the single question:
[S]hould [Laffey] be overruled to the extent that it holds that
in awarding attorneys' fees to a private law firm that custom-
arily charges below the prevailing community rate in order to
serve a particular type of client, courts should calculate the
'reasonable hourly rate' according to the hourly rates charged
in similar cases by that firm, as opposed to rates that reflect
the prevailing community rate for similar legal services[?]'
63
Noting that in determining a reasonable fee, Blum allows
the highly paid commercial, for-profit law firm to receive its
usual handsome rates and a legal aid attorney tied to the pre-
vailing market rate of purely for-profit firms to receive similar
fees, the D.C. Circuit expressly overruled Laffey. The court held
that Laffey created an anomalous result in the situation where
attorneys whose practice combines elements of higher fee private
practice and lower fee public interest practice find their fees cast
in the lower range. The court reached deep into old legislative
history to find the Congressional intent that prevailing market
rates are required to attract competent counsel.' 64 The court
distinguished its decision from Supreme Court decisions that
have criticized the multi-variable Johnson twelve-factor analy-
sis, 1 65 and breathed new life into the use of the twelve-pronged
analysis to find reasonable fees. 66 The dissent criticized the
majority for ignoring recent Supreme Court decisions and the
entire evolution of fee shifting jurisprudence shifting away from
Johnson.1 67 The dissent criticized the majority for relying on
162 Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, No. 85-5984, (D.C. Cir. Sept. 16,
1988) [hereinafter SOCM III].
163 Id.
, Id. at 11. The theory that prevailing market rate is required in order to attract
competent counsel ignores the fact that the attorneys in SOCM instituted the action in
1981, two years before the Supreme Court's Blum decision regarding prevailing market
rates. Obviously, competent counsel was attracted to the case before the notion of
"prevailing market rate" was decided. Id.
165 See id. dissent at 2, 3 (Starr, J., dissenting).
- Id. at 12.
167 Id., dissent at 3, citing Delaware Valley I as reporting Johnson's demise.
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Johnson and three other cases 168 found couched in the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act' 69 to justify overturning a case
which provided one share of stability in federal fee shifting.
In remanding the case to the District Court for a fee deter-
mination, the majority noticed that SOCM has been in the courts
since 1981 and had directly concerned attorneys fees since 1985.
The court paradoxically recognized the admonition of the Su-
preme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart that attorney fees should
not result in "a second major litigation."'
170
Circuit Judge Starr, in summarizing the death knell for Laf-
fey's succinctness, reiterated sentiments expressed by then Circuit
Judge Bork regarding judicial ratemaking in SOCM II. Judge
Starr stated that "judicial rate making will now be reushering
in with gusto .... ,"171 He also observed that by overturning
Laffey, the majority which is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's mandate, will create an enormous administrative bur-
den. 172
It is easy to imagine that the next logical step in this genre
of litigation will be the attorney who feels that his market rate
should be cast amidst those of firms who command high fees
for their services versus an opponent who will argue that the
attorney is not worth a specific market rate. The court will then
find itself in the uncomfortable subjective position of scrutiniz-
ing each particular attorney's "value." This is not a position in
which our overburdened judiciary should be found.
The principle underlying Laffey was one that should be
fostered by the courts in this largely judge-made area of law.
Simplicity in application, predictability by opponents, and ease
of administration are all goals to be sought in keeping secondary
litigation to a minimum. Laffey, as Judge Starr noted, worked.
1 73
I" Standford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974); David v. County
of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ! 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Swann v. Charlotte
Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 484 (W.D. N.C. 1975).
,69 S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976).
110 No. 85-594, slip op. at 20.
, See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
No. 85-594, slip op. at 19 (dissent).
" Id. at 17.
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B. Multipliers - Enhancing the Lodestar
The first major issue in determining a reasonable fee was
the concept, which continues to evolve, of determining the lode-
star, that is, the reasonable hours times a reasonable rate. The
second major issue a court views in determining a reasonable
fee is "multipliers." This area is also under judicial evolution.
The enhancement or upward adjustment to the lodestar was
the second major issued addressed in Blum. 174 The district court
in Blum had awarded a "bonus" fifty percent increase in attor-
ney fees based on subjective factors such as the complexity of
the litigation, novelty of issues, the high quality of representa-
tion, the "great benefit" to the class and the "riskiness" of the
lawsuit. 175 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
award.
Recognizing that these individual factors still leave the John-
son analysis 176 intact, the Supreme Court used Blum to consoli-
date the multiple variable analysis into a more refined analysis.
The court observed that factors such as the "quality of repre-
sentation," "the novelty and complexity of the issues," and the
"results obtained" are usually reflected in hourly rates and
number of billed hours and should not provide an independent
basis for increasing a fee award. 77 Even the "results obtained"
that was so critical in Hensley178 was discarded as an independent
variable. The effect of Blum is to create a firm position against
the subjective Johnson factors. 1
79
The Court, citing Hensley, left the door open, however, for
enhancements of the fee based on "exceptional success."' 80 The
burden, of course, is on the applicant to prove that enhancement
is necessary to provide fair and reasonable compensation.' 8' The
Court attempted to eliminate the enumerated factors of Johnson.
,' 465 U.S. at 898.
,71 Id. See also 465 U.S. at 896 n. 15 (The court dispels the district courts use of
the word "bonus" in characterizing the additional fee over and above the lodestar.).
,76 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
, 465 U.S. at 898-901.
,71 461 U.S. at 434.
,71 Dobbs supra note 10, at 469.
465 U.S. at 901 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)).
"' 465 U.S. at 901-02.
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However, by allowing an "exceptional success" multiplier, con-





Justice Brennan, concurring, further opened the door for
future litigation by noting that Congress has clearly indicated
that the risk of not prevailing, and therefore the risk of not
recovering any attorney fees, is a proper basis on which a district
court may award an upward adjustment.' 83 In what appears to
be backpedalling, he reached back to legislative history'8 4 to find
references to Johnson and "whether the fee is fixed or contin-
gent" as a determinative factor in fee enhancement." 5 This
possible upward multiplier is referred to as the "contingency
multiplier" or the "risk of loss multiplier."
After Blum, the lodestar methodology was defined and two
issues remained to be decided regarding fee enhancements: 1)
what is an "exceptional case" and 2) how to determine/define
the "contingency" multipliers.
These issues came to the Supreme Court in the context of a
Clean Air Act'86 case, Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens
Council for Clean Air8 7 (Delaware Valley I). In Delaware Valley
1, the district court broke the litigation into phases and awarded
multipliers of two and four times the lodestar for certain liti-
gation phases in order to reflect the low likelihood of success
for the plaintiffs, as well as the high quality of representation.1
8
Not all phases were awarded multipliers. The Court of Appeals
affirmed,8 9 citing Blum's "exceptional" success factor. The ma-
jority of the Supreme Court in Delaware Valley I took the
opportunity to find that the lodestar figure includes most, if not
012 Id. at 902 n. 23. ("As we stated in Hensley, '[a] request for attorney fees should
not result in secondary litigation'."). 461 U.S. at 437.
113 465 U.S. at 902.
114 S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976); H. R. REP. No. 1558, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess.
81 465 U.S. at 903-04.
116 Clean Air Act § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1970) (this statute is as discussed
supra note 43 nearly identical to SMCRA fee shifting statute § 520(d)).
"I Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546
(1986).
"I Id. at 554-55 (The lodestar sum for one phase (Phase V) was $27,372 and was
raised to $108,490.). See 581 F. Supp. 1412 (1985).
Is 762 F.2d 272, 280-82 (3d Cir. 1986).
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all, of the relevant factors comprising a reasonable attorney's
fee and that it is unnecessary to enhance the fee for superior
performance.' 90 The majority indicated that there must be spe-
cific evidence presented to show that the results obtained by the
plaintiff were "so outstanding" and that the lodestar figure was
far below awards made in similar cases.' 9' The Court reversed
the award of multipliers and thus, as the dissent indicated, "the
Court heightened the showing required [for exceptional results
multipliers] to the point where it may be virtually impossible for
a plaintiff to meet."' 92 What types of results are "exceptional
successes" to allow a grant of fee enhancement has proven
elusive to SMCRA litigants.' 93
In Delaware Valley I, the Court refused to address the risk
of loss/contingency multiplier. Recognizing that this issue was
worthy of full briefing and argument the Court set it for rear-
gument. The issue to be addressed in Delaware Valley IP94 was
"whether attorney's fees chargeable to a losing defendant .. .
may be enhanced based on the risk of loss, and if so, to what
extent? "191
C. Risk of Loss Adjustment (Contingency Multiplier)
Justice Brennan addressed the concept of contingency or
"risk of not prevailing" multipliers explicitly in Blum' 96 and
opened the door for one of the Johnson factors to remain in
the analysis of what constitutes a reasonable fee. 97 Before the
Supreme Court decided Blum, lower courts solidly favored con-
478 U.S. at 564-67.
Id. at 567-68.
,92 Id. at 569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" See Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Plaintiffs counsel was successful in being awarded a rehearing en banc. The panel held
that "we . . .do not find that the mere fact that such rehearing is granted constitutes
an 'exceptional success' that supports the award of a multiplier .... A grant of
rehearing, [en banc] simply contains no necessary implication that counsel's representa-
tion was above average." The D.C. Circuit then reversed the lower court's award of
50% multiplier for exceptional cases. Id.
"1 107 S.Ct. at 3078 (1987).
191 478 U.S. at 568.
- 465 U.S. 886, 902-04 (1983) (Brennan, J. concurring). See supra notes 173-75
and accompanying text.
' See supra note 122, factor 6.
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tingency or risk multipliers, g9 probably in reliance on the all-
inclusive list found in the Johnson test' 99 and cases cited by
Congress. 200 After Blum, many courts relied on Justice Brennan's
concurrence in order to continue awarding fee enhancements for
the risk of not recovering any attorney fees. 20 Some courts did
not. The Seventh and D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals have re-
fused to award risk enhancement, and other courts have refused
risk enhancements for a variety of reasons. 20 2 The contingency
multiplier has also been critically analyzed by many commenta-
tors.
203
The contingency multiplier has been addressed in many con-
texts including several SMCRA cases 2°4 in the federal courts. For
example, in Utah International v. Department of Interior,20 5 the
court refused to grant risk of loss multipliers. The court theo-
rized that adjustment of the attorney's fee to compensate for
the risk of non-payment if the party should lose on the merits
is inconsistent with SMCRA's mandate as interpreted in light of
Ruckelshaus2 °6 (that only a prevailing party may be awarded
attorney fees). 20 7 This theory comports with the Hensley holding
that excludes legal services rendered in connection with unsuc-
cessful claims. 20 8 To award multipliers for the risk of losing
191 Dobbs, supra note 10, at 472.
I" See supra note 122.
100 See supra note 124, see also Note, Non Payment Risk Multipliers: Incentives or
Windfalls?, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 1074 n. 60 (1986).
201 Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 107 S.Ct. 3078
at 3082 (1987). (Delaware Valley II, regarding the award of lodestar risk enhancement).
202 Id. at n. 4 (citing circuit court cases to illustrate the circuits' split on the issue
of whether the fee should be enhanced for the risk of loss).
203 See Dobbs, A warding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Prob-
lem, 1986 DUKE L.J. 435 (1986); Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees: What is
Reasonable?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1977); Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in
Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473 (1981); Note, Nonpayment Risk Multipliers:
Incentives or Windfalls? 53 U. CHI. I! REV. 1074 (1986); Note, Attorney Fees and the
Contingency Factor Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988: Blum v. Stenson, 64 OR. L. REV. 571
(1986).
20, Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 43 (1987), Utah Int'l, Inc.
v. Dep't of Interior, 643 F. Supp. 810 (D. Utah 1986); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Miller,
No. 86-99 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
210 Utah Int'l v. Dep't of Interior, 643 F. Supp. 810 (D. Utah 1986).
206 Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
20" 643 F. Supp. at 829.
208 Id.
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hedges the statute's requirement that only prevailing parties may
recover fees.2°9 In other words, if a party can't get a fee if he
doesn't prevail, why should he get a larger fee because he might
not have prevailed? In SOCM II, the D.C. Circuit refused to
award multipliers for risk of loss. Without making an extensive
critical analysis of risk of loss awards, as it did in prior cases
where it denied such awards,210 the court cited the recent Su-
preme Court decision in Delaware Valley H.211
Delaware Valley H is the first case in which the Supreme
Court squarely addressed the idea of contingency multipliers.
The vote showed a split in the Court and provided a 4-4-1
decision with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concurring in parts
of each plurality. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, which
in the absence of a majority opinion provides the narrowest
rationale for the Supreme Court's disposition of the judgment
before it, constitutes the Court's holding in the case. 212 The
Supreme Court by a 5-421 vote confirmed the propriety of risk-
based enhancements and clarified other aspects. By a different
5-4 majority the court announced some guidelines for the award
of such enhancements. 2t4 Showing a divisiveness regarding the
concept as a whole, Justice White argued for the plurality that
the legislative history is, at best, inconclusive in determining
whether Congress endorsed the concept. 215 The plurality dis-
cussed, inter alia, several of the major weaknesses in the concept:
1 It "forces losing defendants to compensate plaintiff's law-
yers for not prevailing against defendants in other cases"; 21 6
2 It penalizes defendants who have the strongest cases;
217
_ Id.
210 Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
21, 107 S.Ct. 3078 (1987). See also Newberg, Decision Affects Enhancements Re-
quired in Statutory Fee Awards, NATIONAL L.J. Feb. 22, 1988 at 18-20 (Feb. 22, 1988)
(discussion of plurality opinion and its implicatiotis).
21 826 F.2d 43, 53 n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193, regarding how to interpret a plurality opinion).
23 Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens (dissenting), and O'Connor (con-
curring).
2" Chief Justice Rhenquist and Justices Powell, White and Scalia (plurality opinion)
and Justice O'Connor (concurring).
2 15 107 S.Ct. at 3086.
216 Id.
217 Id. (Since defendants with strong cases have a higher chance of winning, if they
lose, theoretically the multiplier awarded to the prevailing party would be higher.).
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3 It is not necessarily the reason lawyers take public interest
cases;
218
4 It is difficult in administration and gives the possibilities
of inequities to those who must pay the attorney fees;
21 9
5 It creates a potential conflict of interest between an attorney
and client since in order to show a risk of a loss, the
attorney must show inherent weaknesses in his case;
220
6 In order to determine the proper size of the fee enhance-
ment, a court must retroactively estimate the prevailing
parties' chances for success.
2 '
Justice White explained that the lodestar is presumed to be the
reasonable fee; enhancement for the risk of non-payment should
be reserved for exceptional cases where the need and justification
are readily apparent and supported by evidence.
222
The plurality made three major assertions regarding risk
enhancements: 1) the risk of non-payment should be determined
at the beginning of the litigation; 223 2) if the case was "excep-
tional" and therefore, falling within the aura of the risk based
enhancement, the multiplier should be no more than one-third
of the lodestar; 224 and 3) before adjusting for risk assumption,
there should be evidence that without enhancement plaintiff
would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel.
225
Justice O'Connor did not concur with these assertions, which
"I Id. (Since defendants with strong cases have a higher chance of winning, the
plaintiffs have higher risk of loss.).
211 Id. at 3087.
220 107 S.Ct. at 3084 (citing Leubsdorf supra note 193, at 483).
Id. at 3085 (Once the result is known it is hard for judges and lawyers to regain
a perspective of ignorance.).
222 Id. at 3088 (emphasis added) (The dissent and plurality combined to form a
majority that recognizes contingency enhancements generally in exceptional cases. The
court, however, did not describe what would make a case "exceptional.").
11 Id. (This may preclude enhancements for monitoring consent decrees since it
may be unpredictable how much monitoring will be required in the future.).
I, d. at 3089. (The implications of this assertion would preclude one of the major
criticisms of the concept, i.e., that it is unpredictable and requires too much subjectiv-
ity.).
., Id. (The court couched this assertion in terms that a fee award should be
informed by the statutory purpose of making it possible for poor clients with good
claims to secure competent help (emphasis added). This allusion to poor clients, while
comporting with original fee shifting statute purposes as described in early cases raises
the question regarding many plaintiffs in environmental litigation who represent the
public interest, yet are by no means "poor.").
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
were an attempt to provide some basis for determining the
contingency multiplier.
The dissenting four Justices and Justice O'Connor concur-
ring, forming a majority, found that Congress intended to in-
clude contingency risk factors in setting awards under fee shifting
statutes.226 Justice O'Connor addressed contingent cases as a
"class," noting that compensation for contingency must be based
on the difference in market treatment of contingent cases as a
class rather than on an assessment of the riskiness of any par-
ticular case. 227 The dissent reiterated the theme. Justice Blackmun
noted that, "Once it is recognized that it is the fact of contin-
gency, not the likelihood of success in any particular case, that
mandates an increase in attorney fees, the frightening difficulties
envisioned by the plurality disappear. ' 228 Therefore, a majority
favors enhancement in ordinary and exceptional cases.
2 9
The dissent provides a two part test for determining a rea-
sonable risk enhancement. The first part requires a court's anal-
ysis of several factors:
a. Determine whether the attorneys took the case on a con-
tingent basis;
b. Whether they were able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment
in any way; and
c. Whether other economic risks were aggravated by the con-
tingency of payment. 20
Based on those factors, the court should arrive at an enhance-
ment for risk that as closely as possible parallels the premium
for contingency that exists in prevailing market rates. 23 In the
second part of the two part test, the court might also determine
whether the case at hand deserves extra enhancement because of
significant legal risks apparent at the outset 2 2 of the litigation
226 107 S.Ct. at 3092-95 (Blackmun, J. dissenting); Id. at 3089 (O'Connor, J.
concurring).
-' Id. at 3089 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (emphasis in original).
2n Id. at 3098 (Blackmum, J. Ilissenting).
229 See Newberg, supra note 211, at 18 col. I & at 20 cot. 2.
230 107 S.Ct. at 3101-02.
231 Id. at 3102.
232 Cf. 107 S.Ct. at 3085 (both the plurality and dissent indicate that, in exceptional
cases, risk of loss should be determined at the outset of the case).
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and because of the importance of the case. 233 Justice O'Connor,
although concurring, took the position that there should be a
fee enhancement for risk. She also pointed out that the dissent
did not explain how the theory should be put into practice
234
and that the extra enhancement for exceptional cases is subject
to the many difficulties described by the plurality. 235 Appearing
to agree with the plurality, Justice O'Connor opined that the
method for calculating a fee award must be not merely justifiable
in theory but also objective and non-arbitrary in practice.
236
Justice O'Connor did not concur in the plurality's one-third
multiplier, which was an attempt to resolve this confusing, sub-
jective area of fee shifting jurisprudence. Therefore, determining
what is an objective and non-arbitrary methodology is still sub-
ject to further litigation or legislative action. Although what is
the perfect methodology is subject to debate, Delaware Valley
II did provide some further clarifications on the law of fee
shifting:
The applicant for fees must establish that without adjustment
for risk, the prevailing party would have faced substantial
difficulties in finding counsel in the locale on other relevant
market;
23 7
When the plaintiff has agreed to pay its attorney, win or lose,
the attorney has not assumed the risk of non-payment and
there is no occasion to adjust the lodestar fee;
238
Novelty and difficulty of the issues presented and the potential
for protracted litigation are factors adequately reflected in the
lodestar and not to be considered in risk multiplier. 3 9
"I See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text. (The second part of the test cuts
against the "contingency as a class" rationale of both the concurrence and dissent since
it obviously is case specific.)
107 S.Ct. at 3090.
235 Id.
236 Id.
23 Id. at 3091 (O'Connor, J. concurring); see also id. at 3089 (plurality opinion)
(This test seems difficult since by the time fees are subject to litigation, there is obviously
competent counsel attracted to the case.).
231 107 S.Ct. at 3082 (citing Jones v. Central Soya Company, 748 F.2d 586, 593
(11th Cir. 1984) (O'Connor, J. concurring at 107 S.Ct. 3090). See also id. at 3098, 3099
(dissenting opinion) (Justice Blackmun cites ABA Amicus Curiae, pp. 18-22, recognizes
that where an attorney has been promised some compensation, even though not the
entire lodestar, he has in fact mitigated the risk of non-payment.).
239 Id. at 3087 (O'Connor, J. concurring at 3090).
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Delaware Valley H, although trying to provide a respite to
the prolongation of secondary and tertiary litigation regarding
attorney fees, illustrates the basic dicotomy in the law as it shifts
away from the American Rule: on one side a longing for an
absolute method and on the other side a wrestling with what
factors make a fee award reasonable. Continued debate and
theoretical modelling of the contingent market will not provide
stability to fee shifting jurisprudence. The plurality's attempt to
solidify the multiplier, if there is to be one, at a specific figure
will provide the predictability that litigants should be able to
expect when their financial resources are at stake.
CONCLUSION
As Justice Brennan has noted, the fee shifting statute's
"straightforward command is replaced by a vast body of arti-
ficial, judge-made doctrine, with its own arcane procedures,
which like a Frankenstein's monster meanders its well-inten-
tioned way through the legal landscape leaving waste and con-
fusion (not to mention circuits split) in its wake." 240 As each
opinion strives to refine the technique, it merely effectuates
further litigation and abstract rationalizations. Judicial ratemak-
ing has been disfavored in the past and judicially derived eco-
nomic models are subject to interpretation by too many courts
in too many cases since there are over one hundred and fifty
federal statutes with fee shifting provisions.
24'
The SMCRA practitioner, both private and public, must be
aware of the evolving jurisprudence as the courts struggle to
develop a fair and consistent system for awarding attorney fees.
It is essential that an efficient and predictable fee shifting system
be developed. Congress, by enacting statutes such as SMCRA
sections 1270(d) and 1275(e), has made it clear that public inter-
est litigation is one method for effectuating our public policies.
WILLIAM T. GORTON, III
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 455 (1983).
, See supra note 5.
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